

ITALY

Emanuela Orlando and Massimiliano Montini

1

1. Political Situation

Is EU climate (and energy transition) policy generally supported or viewed critically in the respective national political context? How has national climate (and energy transition) policy developed in recent years? What are the prospects for future political developments?

In terms of the overall political landscape, [political analyses](#) of the Italian situation indicate that in general there is a divide in terms of support for the EU Green Deal and EU climate ambition, with left-wing and centre-left parties being more supportive compared to right-wing coalition.

Since 2022, a conservative government is in power with Giorgia Meloni as prime minister. During this time, the country overall saw some important improvements in climate ambition and appears on a good track to achieve the 2030 emission reduction targets. A 2023 report by IEA identified an important improvement in Italy's climate ambitions since 2016. According to this report, Italy is currently aiming for carbon neutrality by 2050 and the country appears on track to reach its 2030 targets for emissions reductions and energy efficiency, aiming for 30% renewable in total energy consumption and 55% renewable in electricity generation. This target was set out in its 2021 long term strategy. The government at that time also took encouraging steps to overcome the long permitting procedures and administrative burdens which had in the past delayed new renewable installations (<https://www.iea.org/reports/italy-2023>).

These figures are confirmed by a 2024 [report by the European Parliament research service \(EPRS\)](#). This same report by the European Parliament also highlights that in a 2023 survey, 45% of Italians (compared with a 46% average) identified climate change to be one of the four most serious problems facing the world, with 51% believing that EU and 46% believing that national government, needs to take action.

However, recently there has also been resistance to climate transition measures, triggered particularly by economic and competitiveness concerns and a difficult geopolitical situation globally. These economic and financial concerns explain the current attitude of the Italian Government, which while generally supporting the EU climate mitigation objectives, has also been pushing for a balanced approach.

In particular, it has in various occasions stressed that its support for a revision of the EU Climate – which envisaged a 90% emission reduction by 2040 – would be subject to the EU changing its approach to climate mitigation efforts. Thus, it proposed to set a new *intermediate* target to 2040, accompanied by enabling conditions (i.e. instruments that allow the targets to be reached without compromising the European economy), plus sufficient resources to be allocated to enable that (<https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/10/22/eu-meloni-italy-will-not-support-climate-law-revision-without-a-change-of-approach/>). It also proposed a biannual revision of the climate mitigation implementation package (in addition to the ordinary revision every five years), although this proposal attracted the criticism of those who think that it would weaken the credibility of the EU climate mitigation objective for 2040 and may also create uncertainties for investments.

To conclude, the current government has shown general support for EU climate mitigation measures, including for the new target of 90% reduction, but it has also been pushing for a balanced and pragmatic approach that protect industrial competitiveness and the economy.

It should also be noted that Italy remains one of the EU's most energy-import dependent countries, which in part explains the current government's revived ambition to make Italy as a gas hub for Europe (source: Clean Energy Wire (CLEW)'s article of 2026 – [Italy moves on green transition, but fossil ties remain tight](#)).

What are the key climate (and energy transition) policy controversies in the national political debate?

In terms of the key climate (and energy transition) policy controversies in the national debate, a central place has been taken by the role of the automotive sector and the transition to Electric Vehicles (EVs). The automotive sector and the car industry in general has been a longstanding component of the Italian economy. However, the sector is currently lagging a bit behind with preparation for the electric transition, with consequent fear that EU's plans in this respect may threaten Italy's car industry competitiveness, while also diminishing its production [sources 2026 [Clean Energy Wire](#) ; and 2024 [Politico](#)].

What has been the role of the Courts in your national context?

Climate litigation has in recent years entered also the Italian national context, with legal actions brought in courts against the state and against private companies. These include the 'giudizio universale' climate lawsuit, which was filed by a group of environmental non-governmental organisations (hereinafter, "NGOs") and citizens in June 2021 in the Civil Court of Rome. The plaintiffs sued the Italian government for allegedly failing to meet its international obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement; the lawsuit ended with a ruling of inadmissibility due to lack of jurisdiction on the basis of the principle of separation of powers, as the court (the Tribunal of Rome) considered that a court ruling on the responsibility of the Italian state which would order the government to increase its ambition in climate mitigation would encroach upon the domain reserve of politics.

Almost in parallel to the *giudizio universale* lawsuit, in May 2023, a number of NGOs filed a suit against the Italian energy company ENI SpA, asking that it be declared liable for climate change-related damages and ordered to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The case went to Appeal before Joint Sections of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation which through their

ruling of July 18, 2025, confirmed for the first time the jurisdictional competence of the Italian judiciary, particularly in relation to action against private companies, and offered authoritative guidance on this point. In particular, while in the *Giudizio Universale* ruling the Tribunal of Rome declared the lack of jurisdiction based on the principle of the separation of powers, this case was different as it was not an action against the state but against a private company.

From those developments we can infer that courts are increasingly asked to rule on climate change related actions, and therefore in principle the judiciary is in a position of playing a potentially important role in this context. At the same time, the decision of the tribunal of Rome to decline its jurisdiction in a lawsuit against the Italian government may represent, if confirmed in future rulings, a precedent undermining the impact of climate strategic litigation aimed at increasing state mitigation efforts. As things stand, it seems therefore that plaintiffs may have better chance to enforce emission reduction commitments against fossil fuels companies.

It is worth mentioning at this point, a recent ruling from the court of Piacenza in a civil lawsuit between the NGO Legambiente and 12 Italian citizens against a company in charge of building underground multistorey parking garage. The action was a precautionary procedure aimed at avoiding the cutting of trees in the area concerned by the project. In its ruling, the court referred to the right to a healthy environment, which is intrinsically linked to human dignity and affirmed that environmental protection must also include specific climate mitigation measures (Ruling RG 1439/2024, Alberi di Piazza Cittadella) as the human right to a healthy environment also include the right to a liveable climate.

2. Overall Climate Policy Targets

Are the EU's overall climate targets (2035/2040/2050) considered adequate / too ambitious / insufficient in national politics

For Italy, the ESR reduction target is of 43,7% compared to 2005 levels to be reached by 2030. Additionally, the LUCLEF Regulation (2018/841/EU) envisaged an Italian objective of emissions absorption of – 35,8% MtCO₂ eq by 2030.

While Italy has generally been supportive of EU climate measures, there seems to be increasing concern that those targets may be rather ambitious.

According to a report annexed to the Document on Energy and Finance presented to the Italian Parliament (Camera dei Deputati) in 2024 :

“the reduction effort requested in light of the updated Effort Sharing target is proving to be very demanding and challenging: in order to comply with the emissions trajectory for the period 2021–2030 (a trajectory still being defined), which must lead to a 43.7% reduction compared to 2005 levels, it will be necessary to immediately initiate a significant reduction in emissions of over 30% compared to 2021 levels, to be achieved primarily in the transport and civil sectors (in particular the residential and tertiary sectors). There is no doubt that the path to achieving the new European target will require a major effort, including in terms of investment, from the entire country,

particularly in light of the significant and profound changes that have taken place in the economic and geopolitical landscape”.

Has the Member State set more ambitious national climate targets (“gold plating”)? If so, what additional national targets are being pursued?

In general, Italy has not set more ambitious climate target.

From the **final version** of the NEPC submitted in July 2024, the overall assessment is that Italy’s NPEC is formally aligned with EU minimum requirements, and it is not more ambitious than EU targets. Italy adopts the same framework and legally binding targets set at EU level, namely 55% emission reduction through ETS and the nationally set 43.7% emission reduction for ESR. Italy’s climate objectives are thus framed as national contribution to the EU-wide targets, rather than as autonomous targets.

At the same time, the NPEC identifies as particularly challenging the achievement of EU’s emission reduction objectives for the sectors falling under the ESR as this would require the implementation of drastic measures to achieve more than 30% emission reduction compared to 2021 levels, particularly in the transport, civil and agricultural sector (Italy’s NPEC, p 9-10). In that respect, the Plan acknowledges that, despite the measures envisaged in the National Plans of Resilience and Recovery (PNRR), it is already very difficult to achieve the – 33% emission reduction target by 2030 compared to 2005 level. Therefore, complying with the newly established objective of minus -43.7 will be even more challenging.

More positive appears instead the outlook with respect to renewable energy production and consumption, as the NPEC confirms Italy’s commitment to achieve 40% target of renewable energy consumption by 2030, in line with the expected contribution to fulfil the EU’s targets (and indeed even slightly exceeding the EU 39% target), with a special focus on the contribution of solar and wind energy (see [European Commission Factsheet of the assessment of Italy NECP](#))

3. Emission Trading System I (Industry)

Is ETS I considered appropriate? If not, what reforms are viewed as priorities from the national perspective?

The impact of the current geopolitical crisis and the concerns about industrial and technological competitiveness have strongly influenced the national perspective concerning the appropriateness of ETS. Most recent discussions have indeed witnessed pressure from both members of the Italian government and major industry associations to suspend the ETS because of its negative impact on the competitiveness of Italian industries.

On this point, the President of the Italian industry association Confindustria (source: <https://www.confindustria.it/en/news/competitiveness-eu-confindustria-calls-for-temporary-halt-to-allets/> February 2026) has pointed out that:

‘the ETS is an unbalanced system which in fact burdens the competitive capacity of European industry. Since 1990, global emissions have increased by 70%, driven mainly by China, whose cumulative emissions now exceed those of the entire European Union”.

Currently, only about 25% of global emissions are covered by ETS, while the EU ETS remains very expensive for EU companies. According to Confindustria, this means that strategic sectors - such as steel, chemicals and ceramics, which are already among the most decarbonised globally - risk, being squeezed out of international markets without rapid EU intervention.

The President of Confindustria also highlights the impact on energy prices and thus on households, pointing to the fact that at the moment anyone who consumes good or bad energy (i.e. renewable or gas energy) pays for it in the same way, not incentivising virtuous behaviours”

Those concerns are echoed by representatives of the Government. The Italian Industry’s Minister said the Emissions Trading System (ETS) has a "perverse effect" and is not protecting European companies from “unfair” competition from other countries, such as US and China, urging the European Union to suspend its carbon market until the bloc presents a revised proposal due this summer. In support of this the Ministry cited competitiveness concerns and the hardship faced by European businesses because of high power and carbon costs <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/02/26/italy-calls-for-suspension-of-eu-carbon-market> (February 2026).

4. Emission Trading System II (Buildings and Road Transport)

What share of national total energy consumption is attributable to buildings and road transport?

Transport

According to a recent analysis by the **Institute of International Affairs (Istituto Affari Internazionali)** (<https://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/c05/italys-national-energy-and-climate-plan-and-road-transport-appraisal>) the Italian transport sector remains among the hardest to decarbonize, pointing that while Italy’s greenhouse gas emissions due to energy consumption have overall decreased by 21% from 1990 to 2022, those related to transport have increased by 8% in the same period. Moreover, the transport sector accounted for 27 per cent of national emissions in 2022, with road transport alone accounting for 92 per cent of those emissions.[2]

Similar findings emerge from a study of the International Energy Agency, according to which the Italian transport sector represent roughly 32–34% of total final consumption, with road transport being the primary component of this, responsible for around 92% of all transport-related emissions and an overwhelming majority of its energy consumption.

There are different reasons for this:

- Widespread use of **private cars**, which in 2022 were responsible for 58% of the total transport emissions – particularly due to the overreliance of the car sector on fossil fuels, such as oil products.
- **Heavy-duty road transport**, which represents 29% of total transport emissions.

Compared to private vehicles, the current technology makes transport vehicles harder to be electrified, especially considering heavy-duty trucks. To address that, according to the IAI report, biofuels may represent an interesting alternative option, as also renewable diesel (also called hydrotreated vegetable oil – HVO) or biomethane, which is being supported by dedicated incentives at the national level.

The NECP also supports the development of hydrogen for high-duty vehicles, in particular through a financial backing of hydrogen refuelling stations (with 230 million euros for at least 40 refuelling stations).

Furthermore, the NECP also contains measures supporting the shift of long-distance road freight (where electrification is more difficult) towards alternative sea routes and rail, as well as another measure supporting the deployment of cargo bikes for companies dedicated to last-mile deliveries in urban areas.

- **Public transport by bus:** overall urban buses represent a marginal share of transport emissions in absolute terms (less than 3 %), and incentivizing their use will favour a reduction of emissions by private cars; however, the IAI analysis points out that they often operate in urban environments, so cleaner technologies that can reduce pollutant emissions would also provide additional benefits. There is an increase in electric vehicles for urban transport, but long-distance buses still rely completely on diesel, given the current limited range of electric vehicles and the time required for the battery charging process. Some cities are experimenting the use of hydrogen buses, but evidence suggests higher costs compared to direct electrification, due to a lower efficiency of the supply chain.

Building sector

The building sector remains, together with transport, one of the main contributors to energy consumption, representing (according to data collected through the EU-funded Odysee-Mure project, for 2023) **40% of total energy consumption**. This is mainly due to heating and air conditioning. Moreover, residential buildings are contributing more than other buildings (i.e. residential buildings accounting for approximately 65% of building's final energy consumption).

The same report however also notices that over the past years there has been a trend of decrease in the energy consumption attributable to buildings, including a decrease in the households' energy consumption (1,5% / year) probably due to mild climate and to the change to more efficient heating system. The only households' end-use energy that has not decreased is the air conditioning, which instead has been increasing.

Over the past years, the government has adopted a number of fiscal and financial measures that aimed to support energy efficiency. These included tax deductions for building renovations (although these were reduced from 50% to 36% in 2025 and 30 % in 2026-27); a contribution by the government of eur 500 million to the fund for development and cohesion to finance investments, among various things, also for the reduction of energy consumptions such as energy efficiency improvements in public and private residential buildings. Many of these measures are funded through the National Plan for Recovery and Resilience and through other sources and are in addition to the measures envisaged in the NECP [source: <https://www.odyssee-mure.eu/publications/efficiency-trends-policies-profiles/italy.html>].

Is the postponement of ETS II to 2028 viewed positively?

While several environmental associations have expressed disappointment for the decision, this was instead welcome “as a sensible decision” by some representative organisations of the categories affected by the ETS II, such as the Italian Industry Association for the Transport Sector (ANITA) – the association however also expressed support for the decarbonization of the transport sector and the principle of technological neutrality.

As for the members of the categories affected by the ETS II, the decision to postpone it was welcomed “as a sensible decision”. This was ANITA the Italian industry association of the transport sector. The association has however expressed support for the decarbonization of the transport sector and the principle of neutral technology (*neutralità tecnologica*) <https://blueconomy.com/it/diritto-e-finanza/i-regolamenti/morelli-anita-bene-il-posticipo-del-meccanismo-ets2/>

At the same time, others transport associations and relevant companies have voiced concerns during auditions at the Parliamentary Commission for EU policies (*Commissione Politiche Europee della Camera dei Deputati*) about the costs that the inclusion of the transport sector into ETS II will entail, especially given that at the moment technological alternatives to diesel (which is the most diffuse technology among the heavy transport vehicles) are neither fully developed nor widely adopted. They also pointed out that the postponement to 2028 will not actually resolve the problem unless there are specific measures in place aimed at reinvesting the proceeds from ETS into the transport sector, starting with the renewal of the vehicle fleet and support for businesses that will have to navigate the transition. <https://www.truck24.it/ets2-rinviato-al-2028-i-costi-per-lautotrasporto-restano-e-rischiano-di-diventare-strutturali/>

Are buildings and road transport already part of a national regulatory regime that anticipates elements of ETS II?

In Italy, buildings and road transport have been recently subjected to national legal requirements that derive from EU ETS II legislation and aim at its implementation. In particular, the new requirements apply to emission from fuels placed on the market in the road transport, building and residential sector, and for certain small industries: essentially, by 1 January 2025, regulated entities must hold a permit to place fuel (solid, liquid and gaseous) on the market for the activities listed in Annex III to Directive 2003/87/EC, and from 2025 they must monitor the emissions from fuels placed on the market and report them to the Competent National Authority by 30 April each year, in accordance with the Monitoring Plan to be drawn up and submitted to the CNA at the time of the aforementioned authorisation application.

By 30 April 2025, regulated entities must report historical emissions for the year 2024, the monitoring of which will be carried out in a simplified manner.

From 2027, the market phase will commence with the auctioning of emission allowances, which must be surrendered by 31 May 2028.

How are the prospects for decarbonizing the national building and transport sectors assessed?

No specific and adequate information about this could be found.

5. Double regulation?

Is there a discussion about the topic of 'double' regulation: e.g. energy efficiency in ETS installations / build environment, National taxes on/pricing of CO2 emissions, Emission Limit Values in environmental permits?

No specific and adequate information about this could be found.

6. Effort Sharing

Is the Member State “on track” to meet its national reduction targets under the Effort Sharing Regulation 2018/842? Is failure / compliance / over-achievement of the EU requirements expected?

Complying with the ESR targets is proving challenging for Italy.

A recent report by ISPRA (*Italian institute for environmental protection and research*) (Report 414/2025, “*Le emissioni di gas serra in italia: obiettivi di riduzione e scenario emissive*”) provides an analysis of emission scenarios with a 2030 and 2055 horizon, both considering the reference scenario (with current policies) and the scenario with additional policies.

8

The report points out in particular that historically the emissions falling within the ESR have represented always the majority of total emissions for Italy. In 2023 these were 70% of total emissions.

Against this background, with regard to the ESR, the reference scenario with policies adopted up to 2022 shows that Italy is not able to achieve the required reduction in emissions (i.e. 43,7 % to 2030 compared to 2005 levels) and that there is indeed a significant distance (p. 87).

The policy scenario – i.e. the scenario including the further reduction policies identified in the National Integrated Energy and Climate Plan (scenario with additional policies) offers improvements but it still shows distance with the emissions reduction targets set by the ESR Regulation for the period 2021-2030.

Confronted with the emission reductions expected for ETS, the data shows that this is in both scenarios much higher than that foreseen for the ESR. Therefore, according to the analysis, it is clear that both measures currently in force and the additional ones are envisaged in the NECP are effective particularly in reducing ETS emissions (such as, for example, policies aimed at supporting the increase in renewables in the electricity generation mix). Specifically, for ETS sectors, the expected emissions reduction is between 60 and 69%, whereas for ESR is between 30 and 40 %, thus less than the required under the EU target. Thus, it seems that the measures envisaged by the 2024 NECP are not enough to effectively meet the objectives set at EU level, at least as far as the ESR targets are concerned. This is also what emerges from the analysis of the [Think Tank ECCO Clima](#), which highlight important divergences especially for the transport sector, and for the civil sector and the small industries.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/767178/EPRS_BRI%282024%29767178_EN.pdf

<https://www.isprambiente.gov.it/en/publications/reports/greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-italy-reduction-targets-and-emission-scenarios>

What are the main challenges or success factors influencing compliance or non-compliance with the EU requirements?

For ESR, the transport sector is highly problematic, as it accounts for the largest share of both total national emissions and total emissions falling within the scope of the Effort Sharing mechanism.

Does the state intend to sell its own emission credits or to purchase such credits from other Member States?

Overall, Italy is also pushing for flexibility to purchase and use international carbon credits to meet its emission reduction targets, rather than solely relying on domestic emission reductions.

Moreover, according to the aforementioned ISPRA report, for the LULUCF sector, data for the period 2021–2023 show that carbon neutrality for the period 2021–2025 is expected to be achieved without difficulty, thereby allowing, under the Effort Sharing Regulation, the use of a limited quantity of LULUCF credits to contribute to the achievement of national Effort Sharing targets (so-called LULUCF flexibility) amounting to 5.75 MtCO₂ eq. for the period 2021–2025.

The report anticipates that it should be possible to use LULUCF flexibility also for the 2026–2030 period as well, considering that for that time range the baseline scenario included in the Document on Economy and Finance 2025 shows that the annual targets, as well as the overall target set for 2030, are expected to be met.

7. Renewable Energy

What progress has been made in the transition towards a national energy supply based on renewable energy?

According to data from ENEA, and from the IEA (<https://www.iea.org/countries/italy>) over the past few years (2024-2025), Italy has been making significant progresses on the production and supply of renewable energy (according to ENEA report the renewable energy production has increased by 8% in 2024). Moreover, the revised targets set in the 2024 NPEC [almost 40% renewable energy in total consumption and 65% in electricity generation by 2030] indicates a strong commitment to pursue climate neutrality.

Renewable energy capacity has been expanding through various phases. It has first known a significant expansion particularly between 2010 and 2013 allowing Italy to reach the 2020 target, set out in the Renewable Energy Directive, already in 2014 [source: [European Parliament Research Brief](#), 2024].

Currently, if we focus specifically on the gross **energy consumption**, renewable energy sources (RES) still accounted only for 19.5 % of final energy consumption in 2023. However, data from the NPEC shows that pursuant to the policy scenario, which would result to the implementation of all policies and measures envisaged, Italy aims to reach a 39,4 % of renewable energy share in the final energy consumption by 2030 [this face to an EU objective of 38.7% (REPower EU and Fit 55)].

Moreover, there is an objective of 63,4% in the gross consumption of electricity by 2030 and 34% in the transport sector. This seems to represent an improvement from the current scenario, where the target seems instead to be 26% of gross energy consumption, with 53% in electricity sector and 15% in transport (PNIEC p 17).

An increase in electricity production from RES is expected, driven particularly by the expansion of solar and onshore wind capacity. Innovative technologies like floating solar and floating offshore wind are expected to play a growing role. Moreover, Italy promotes renewable-energy communities and self-consumption (see further below).

What is the current energy mix, and what are the projections up to 2050?

In terms of the energy mix, photovoltaic (solar panels) remains the main source of renewable energy production, with particularly strong inputs from Sicily, Lazio and Lombardia region, totally over 37GW installed. According to a report by Terna, in 2025 photovoltaic energy contributed to 34,6% of total energy supply from renewable, satisfying 14,2 % of the national demand of energy.

Solar is followed by wind power - although a report from Terna reveals a slowing down in wind power production in 2025 due to climatic factor (less windy conditions).

Italy is also a strong producer of biogas and biomethane, thanks to a strong agricultural base.

Italy is also pushing on green hydrogen. It launched in November 2024 its National Hydrogen and is developing a major trans-European infrastructure project that connects Italy's hydrogen network to Austria and Germany, and could be extended to allow for the import of renewable hydrogen from Algeria and Tunisia.

Investments in renewable energy technologies, especial solar, biogas and green hydrogen are financially supported by the NPRR.

At the same time, more recently, Italy has been considering adding nuclear to its future energy supply after 2035. The ministry for environment and energy security set up a National Platform for Sustainable Nuclear Power to coordinate organisations dealing with nuclear energy, safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management.

Despite this stronger focus on renewables and green energy, natural gas still remains a major source for electricity and heating (40% of total energy supply), therefore Italy has strengthened its energy security by diversifying natural gas supply, making use of the pipeline and LNG infrastructure built up over the last decade (IEA: <https://www.iea.org/countries/italy>). Oil and oil products feature for the 36% of total energy supply.

What differences exist in the transformation of the electricity market versus the broader energy market (including non electric heating, transport and other energy use)?

In Italy there seems to be a considerable difference between the energy transition in the electricity sector compared to other sectors (for example transport and heating), as electricity decarbonization is advancing significantly faster than the rest of the energy market. This seems to be explained by the fact that electricity generation relies on solar and wind where there are more mature technologies, while heating and transport are still largely dependent on fossil fuels, mainly natural gas and oil. It can also be explained by structural and behavioural barriers, such as the fact that, for example, in the transport sector, the move towards an increasing use of electric vehicles has been so far very slow.

[<https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/clew-guide-italy-moves-green-transition-fossil-ties-remain-tight>]

What are the major national regulatory instruments to support the transition to renewables?

Since important obstacles hindering the development of renewable energy installations in Italy are permitting and authorization procedure, a legislative decree was adopted on 25 November 2024 (**Testo Unico Rinnovabili, Decreto Legislativo 190/2024**) to simplify and accelerate administrative procedures for the installation and operation of renewable energy plants, in line with the requirements of the EU RED III Directive. The decree introduces three types of energy plants and differentiates procedures accordingly:

- Smaller plants can be built freely, provided they comply with environmental and landscape regulations.
- Medium sized plants will be approved by a fast-track ‘tacit consent’ procedure
- Large / high-capacity plants and offshore plants will be subject to a single state authorisation, which will also include an environmental impact assessment, but which will significantly reduce processing times and bureaucratic requirements.

11

[source: <https://www.riformeistituzionali.gov.it/it/comunicazione/notizie/decreto-legislativo-per-la-produzione-di-energia-da-fonti-rinnovabili/>].

Furthermore, on 24 January 2024, a decree (**decreto CACER no. 414** adopted on 7 December 2023) of the Italian Ministry for Environment and Energy Security entered into force, which provides incentive for the establishment of renewable energy communities with a focus on self-consumption. The decree includes tariff incentives and contribution funded through the Plan of National Resilience and Recovery. The renewable energy communities can include both private individuals, companies and local authorities.

Finally, on 21 June 2024, a decree of the Italian Ministry for Environment and Energy Security has identified the appropriate areas for the installation of the renewable energy plants (GU Serie Generale no. 153 del 2.07.2024). The decree sets annual targets for RES capacity in each Italian region, in order to reach a total of 80 gigawatts in 2030.

What major obstacles hinder a faster transition to renewable energy at the national level? Are adjustments to the EU’s regulatory framework considered necessary? If so, which ones?

Traditionally, main obstacles to the renewable energy transition in Italy have been bureaucracy, including lengthy and cumbersome authorization and permitting procedures which have often resulted in the stall to the installation of new renewable energy plants; the lack of a clear and homogeneous and coordinated regulatory framework which in turn creates uncertainty and risk deter developments; and finally the resistance of local population (nimby phenomenon) and of local authorities.

Moreover, according to a report by the association [Energia Per L’ Italia](#) (2025) there is a too strong and unbalanced emphasis on solar energy with less attention to promoting wind power. Given that solar and wind power usually complement each other in terms of summer and winter output, further development of wind power would ensure more stability in the electricity system.

8. Land Use

How exactly are emissions from the land-use sector recorded nationally? What trends can be derived from this data?

Emissions from Italy's land-use sector, specifically under the Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) sector, are recorded annually by [ISPRA](#) (Italian National Institute for Environmental Protection and Research), which is also responsible for coordinating environmental monitoring, producing and validating national environmental datasets, and providing technical support for policy implementation.

Among ISPRA's key initiative is the production and use of a detailed [nationwide land cover and land use \(LCLU\) map](#), which integrates Copernicus datasets and high-resolution data to measure land-use changes—such as the conversion of agricultural land to artificial surfaces.

Through this map, ISPRA can map and monitor the conversion of natural or agricultural land into artificial surfaces in Italy.

Thus, the LCLU map plays a crucial role in Italy's greenhouse gas inventory, specifically for [LULUCF](#) (Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry) emissions assessments, where accurate land use data is needed to measure how much carbon is absorbed or released by different land cover types.

Beyond emissions reporting, the LCLU map supports the evaluation of land degradation trends and thanks to the map's high level of detail—thanks to the integration of multiple CLMS products—is also a valuable tool for monitoring compliance with the EU's new [Nature Restoration Regulation](#).

Apparently few, if any, other European countries have implemented the same approach as Italy, and there is growing interest in ISPRA's methodology, suggesting that the Italian model could serve as a blueprint for nations looking to improve their land monitoring efforts—especially those without national datasets equivalent to CLMS products like CLCplus Backbone or the various Priority Area Monitoring datasets like [Urban Atlas](#) or [Coastal Zones](#). By adopting a similar framework, other European countries could strengthen their environmental reporting, land use assessments, and compliance with EU sustainability targets.

What strategies are being pursued at the national level to strengthen the land-use sector's contribution to emission reductions and to comply with the LULUCF-Regulation 2018/841?

Under LULUCF regulation the target to be achieved is an absorption of more than 35 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent to 2030. As part of this, the regulation provides for the no debit rule whereby member states commit to ensure that accounted GHGs emissions deriving from land use are totally compensated by an equivalent removal of CO₂ through actions implemented in the sector.

The following measures have been set up in Italy to comply with the LULUCF regulation and the “no debit rule” established therein: <https://www.mase.gov.it/portale/-/lulucf>

- A national plan for forestry accounting which has been set up and is managed by ISPRA.
- A national Forests strategy – which derives directly from the EU Forest strategy of 2021 - with the aim of enabling Italian forests to be resilient, rich in biodiversity and capable of contributing to climate mitigation and adaptation.

- Moreover, Law 41/2023 established (art 45.2 quarter) a public register of carbon credits voluntarily generated by the national agroforestry sector. This register is within the Council for agricultural research (CREA) and aims at incentivizing sustainable forestry and agricultural practices which improve the capacity of CO₂ absorption and that go beyond what established by the national and EU legal frameworks. The carbon credits so produced can be used within a voluntary national market, as previously provided with the establishment of a national register for carbon credits. The law however specifies that the credits used through that registry cannot be used on the EU-ETS market.

9. Special National Strategies, Programmes, and Ideas

What special strategies, regulatory programmes, and ideas—beyond those already mentioned—are being pursued nationally for climate mitigation? How do these national concepts and legal instruments relate to EU climate policy? Does a programme for carbon capture and storage exist?

13

Italy does not have its own framework climate law or a specific climate committee, but a climate decree (Decreto Clima, DL 14 ottobre 2019 n 111) was adopted in 2019, with the aim of reducing polluting emissions and provide compliance with the EU air quality directive. The main measures of this decree included incentives for sustainable transport, reforestation and measures to reduce waste.

Additionally, climate mitigation objectives are pursued through different regulatory frameworks, including legislation aimed furthering the development of renewable energies, policy instruments providing incentives for energy efficiency and through financial support, particularly within the framework of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) (in *Italian*, *Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza* (PNRR)). In 2023, Italy revised and amended its NRRP to include a specific section aimed for the REPower EU plan.

In addition to the various instruments and policies already mentioned in this paper, it is important to mention:

- the **National Long-Term Strategy on reducing emissions of GHGs, adopted in 2021 by the Ministry of the Environment**, which is a multisectoral strategy identifying the possible pathways to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. In the scenario outlined in the strategy, climate neutrality should be reached through a combination of massive renewable energy deployment with the deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage and Carbon Capture and Utilisation technologies to manage residual emissions.

Specifically on CCS, Italy is trying to develop a regional strategy which would include cross border cooperation with countries like Greece and France.

In practical terms, it is worth mentioning the on-going *Ravenna CCS project*, a major project which involves building a CO₂ storage infrastructure. The project is being developed by the energy companies Eni and Snam and has been included in the European Commission's List of Projects of Common Interest. More information here: <https://ravennaccs.com/en-IT/project/ravenna-hub>

10. Social and Regional Compensation Mechanisms

Are there national mechanisms to provide social or regional compensation for the burdens arising from climate protection measures? Is any form of “climate dividend” or “climate payment” being issued?

The following developments can be observed in relation to this point:

1. Italian Social Plan for Climate

Pursuant to the EU requirements to access the EU Climate Social Fund, Italy has approved – previous consultation with the public and relevant stakeholders – the *Piano Sociale per il Clima* (*Social Plan for Climate*). The Italian plan is the main instrument supporting the just ecological transition and has an overall budget of 9,3 million euros.

The Plan comprises measures addressing energy efficiency and heating in building and mobility. With respect to building related measures, financial support will be provided for improving energy efficiency of publicly owned buildings currently classified as energy rating F and G and for buildings of vulnerable microenterprises. Additionally, financial support will be provided to widen access to the Social Bonus Gas Plus. The latter is an automatic discount, in place since 2009, on gas bills for households in financial difficulty, with an income (calculated according to ISEE, indicator of financial standing) of up to euros 9,530 (or 20,000 euros for families with more than four children).

On mobility, the financial support will be directed to the development of public transport services and local transport hubs in disadvantaged areas (euros 3,105 billion), and to a scheme aimed at providing digital travel cards for public transport aimed at people facing transport poverty.

The Plan should be operational from 2026 to 2032.

2. Renewed focus on energy poverty

The issue of energy poverty was already identified in the previous NECP of 2019. Nowadays, it is the object of renewed and increased attention also in the light of the trend increases in fossil fuel prices. In this context, Decree No 131 of 29 March 2022 established the *National Energy Poverty Observatory* (ONPE), an interinstitutional body promoted and led by the Ministry of the Environment and Energy Security, which has among its tasks the monitoring of the energy poverty phenomenon and the development of a law enforcement strategy.

The NECP also reports that in 2023 Italy launched a statistic-methodological project called Energy Poverty Indicator Calculation project aimed at improving and expanding the current indicators of energy poverty.

Currently, however, there is not yet a definition of energy poverty which has been formalized for the Italian legal context, but this is expected to be introduced in national law, most probably through the national decree transposing the new energy efficiency directive 2023/1791. The NPEC however, consider that such definition, and a specific identification of the relevant indicators which are important in the national context, is an important step in order to have a more coherent assessment of the scope of the energy poverty reality in the national context. In particular, the NPEC notices that the existence of multiple different indicators for energy poverty, as recommended at the EU level, may result in a wide variability in the measurement

and assessment of the phenomenon. [see on this also [Camera dei Deputati, Povertà energetica e impatto di genere](#), no. 117, 1 agosto 2024].

3. Support measures through the NRRP (national plan for resilience and recovery)

As part of the implementation of the NRRP, Directorial decree no. 178 of 11 June 2025 has set out the list of entities eligible for funding aimed at the promotion of renewables for energy communities and self-consumption.

Additionally, other support measures include subsidy programmes to support the development of agrivoltaics and biomethane installations.

Most recently, it is worth mentioning the Decreto Bollette (Decreto Legge 20 Febbraio 2026 n. 21) containing urgent measures to reduce costs of electric energy and gas for family and companies. The decree includes a mechanism that aims to offset the costs of ETS compliance for producers of electric energy from natural gas. The measure provides for a reimbursement of the costs of CO₂ allowances incurred by thermal power operators, financed through a new tariff component on consumers' bills.

While the measure has a desirable objective, some critics casted doubts on its actual feasibility. In particular, the think tank ECCO Climate mentioned that it could constitute selective state aid in favour of thermoelectric producers and result in a potential conflict with the ETS system.

Criticism has also been raised about the fact that only 9% of income and resources from ETS (typically income from emission trading permits auctions) are being actually used to support measures addressing climate change and to support energy companies and the other most affected industries in facing the green transition. In that sense, there has been calls for more transparency regarding the use of income generated by the ETS action.

[see: <https://eccoclimate.org/it/proventi-ets-in-italia-utilizzato-solo-il-9-delle-risorse/>; and <https://www.renewablematter.eu/emissions-trading-system-ets-italia-solo-9-percento-fondi-climate-change>].

11. Adaptation

Are there national programmes for climate adaptation? How can these be briefly described? Should the EU, from a national perspective, develop climate adaptation programmes, or should this remain the responsibility of the Member States?

By Ministerial decree n 434/2023 the Italian Ministry for Environment and Energy Security approved the **National Plan for Climate Adaptation** (PNACC – *Piano Nazionale di Adattamento ai Cambiamenti Climatici*).

The adoption of this measure had long been advocated also in the light of the worrying rise in temperature recorded in Italy in 2023 and the commitments made at the international and supranational level.

Prior to that, Italy had adopted in 2015 a National Strategy for adaptation to climate change, and the new plan seems therefore to be an important step towards the implementation of that strategy. The plan is divided in 6 sections, whereby the first three sections concern the legal

background for action and the impact of the climate crisis in Italy, while section 4, 5 and 6 establish the specific adaptation measures, the funding modes and the governance.

Moreover, since 2025, companies with registered offices in Italy need to have an insurance against natural disasters, like floods and landslides (source: Budget Law 2024).

12. New liability/compensation regime in the Air Quality Directive (2024/2881) and the amended IE Directive (2024/1784)

The new Air Quality Directive 2024/2881 (art. 28) and the amended IE Directive (2024/1785) require Member States to establish a liability/compensation regime regarding persons suffering damage to human health caused by violation of the EU-obligations under the two directives. The new EU-obligation should be seen in light of the CJEU-ruling in C-61/21 in which the CJEU rejected Member State liability for human health damage based on the (old) Air Quality Directive. The new obligations place Member States as the subject which should pay compensation for the damage, but the legal implications of the new regimes are not entirely clear. How is the new obligation on liability/compensation in the new Air Quality Directive and the amended IE Directive intended to be implemented in your Member State?

At the moment, there are not yet specific information about the implementation of this obligation in Italy, probably because this is a relatively recent amendment and Italy is still in the process of transposing it.